

Military Government

Weekly

Information Bulletin



OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR
OFFICE OF MILITARY GOVERNMENT (U. S. ZONE)
UNITED STATES FORCES EUROPEAN THEATER

REPORTS AND INFORMATION BRANCH

UNITED STATES ZONE, GERMANY

Greater Hesse, Württemberg-Baden



MILITARY GOVERNMENT

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MILITARY GOVERNMENT LETTERS AND INSTRUCTIONS ISSUED DURING THE WEEK

Repatriated German Prisoners of War Available for Employment by Military Government Detachment or German Authorities	7 January 1946 GEC-253.5
Basic Policy for Information and Information Control Operations in Germany	17 January 1946 AG 350.05 (CS)
Military Government Regulations, Title 23, amended by adding thereto Control Council Order No. 2, "Confiscation and Surrender of Arms and Ammunition"	18 January 1946 AG 014.1 GEC-AGO
Financial Responsibility for German Broadcasting Operations	21 January 1946 AG 210.711 GAP-AGP
Emergency Return of Military Personnel to Zone of Interior	21 January 1946 AG 014.1 GEC-AGO
Rural Police	26 January 1946 GEC-EX 015 (MG Germany)
Insignia, Shoulder Sleeve	25 January 1946 GEC-EX 421.4
Sentences by Military Government Courts in Cases Involving Possession of Firearms	19 January 1946 AG 322.011 GEC-AGO

Denazification Policy Unified

New CC Directive Emphasizes Strict Denazification in Commerce and Industry, and Prescribes Identical Categories for All Four Zones

Two new developments have occurred in denazification. The first, described on this page, is a four-power directive, establishing the class of persons and types of jobs to be denazified throughout Germany; the second, described on page 6, is a proposal, recommending the U.S. Zone procedure and action to be taken against the nazis.



With the signing of Control Council Directive Number 24, the Allies have fixed a uniform denazification policy, applicable in all four zones of Germany. The directive embodies substantially the same provisions now governing denazification within the U.S. Zone. Its newly promulgated and discretionary removal and exclusion categories are virtually identical with those listed in the U.S. Zone 7 July directive. Moreover, no important changes or modifications of existing policies will be required as a result of the Control Council Directive.

A major advantage of the new directive is that a nazi, excluded from office or employment by one Zone Commander, automatically falls within the mandatory removal and exclusion categories affecting all zones. In addition, the directive strengthens denazification by underscoring the policy that near relatives of prominent nazis should not be employed.

The new directive calls for a strong denazification policy in business. It in-

sists that the denazification of industry be carried out with the utmost vigor, and that the small size of an enterprise shall be no reason for failure to denazify. Once a person is "denazified" in industry he is to be discharged forthwith. He is to have no influence, no direct or indirect participation in the concern with which he was associated.

Nazis are to be replaced by persons who, by their political and moral qualities, are deemed capable of assisting in developing genuine democratic institutions in Germany. It is essential, the directive continues, that the head executive German officials at the levels of Provinz, Regierungsbezirk and Kreis be confirmed anti-nazis, even though this entails the employment of persons less well qualified to discharge their administrative duties.

Concerning discretionary removals, the directive states that in cases of doubt persons are not to be employed or left in office if others are available who are politically more reliable, although perhaps administratively somewhat less qualified. Wherever possible, persons in discretionary categories will be given posts of minor responsibility only, until they have proved themselves politically reliable.

Proposed Denazification Program For the U. S. Zone



The U.S. Denazification Policy Board, composed of the directors of five Divisions of the Office of Military Government for Germany (U.S.), and the Political Adviser, has proposed a long-range program for the punishment of major nazis and the eventual rehabilitation of minor nazis within the democratic community. The Board's recommendations, submitted for consideration to Lieutenant General Lucius D. Clay, Deputy Military Governor, set forth a new procedure to carry out the denazification policy of the Control Council Directive.

If adopted, this proposal will determine the political and economic status of nazis eliminated from office. It will set up a system of penalties, forfeitures and sanctions to be imposed upon nazis in accordance with their degree of culpability. On the basis of this system, the Board seeks to avoid arbitrary classification by categories and to give individual treatment to cases, thereby allowing greater discrimination.

It should be realized by MG personnel that the Board's recommendations must be approved in principle by General Clay and General J. McNarney, the Theater Commander, before detailed implementation can be undertaken between the Board, representatives of Headquarters, USFET, and the Minister Presidents.

PROPOSED PROCEDURE

Registration is the first step under the recommended plan. This registration will include all members of the nazi party or affiliated organizations, all persons within the mandatory removal categories of the Control Council Directive, influential

nazi supporters, particularly businessmen and industrialists, and the more active militarists. In addition, five or more Germans can file a petition with the Special Prosecutor to compel the registration of undercover nazis who may have evaded this requirement.

After registration, the cases of those persons who are considered warcriminals will be referred to the United States Chief of Council for War Crimes. All others are to be placed in one of the following four classifications:

Class I — Major Offenders (those who took a leading part).

Class II — Activists, Militarists and Profiteers (active participants or supporters, or recipients of excessive or unjust profits).

Class III — Followers (those who, though members, were never more than nominal nazis).

Class IV — Non-offenders.

As a guide in making these classifications, the Board recommended that presumptive categories be prescribed for "Major Offenders", "Activists", "Militarists", and "Profiteers". These classifications, while not conclusive, will cast the burden upon the nazi to prove by convincing evidence that a lower classification should be made in his case. Another factor in assuring individual treatment of cases is that the penalties, forfeitures and disqualifications to be imposed upon the Class I and II nazis will vary in duration and type according to the degree of guilt.

RECOMMENDED PUNISHMENTS

Among the recommended punishments is the assignment for a specified period to hard labor or to labor camps within Germany. This will be mandatory only for Class I offenders. Other actions to be taken against nazis include forfeiture of property in excess of a specified sum; prohibition for a fixed period from public office or certain professions closely connected with the formation of public opinion; loss of civil service or pension rights; prohibition for a fixed period from owning or controlling business or professional enterprises, or being employed at other than ordinary labor, and communal labor for a specified period.

Mandatory punishments, however, will not be required for Class III registrants, although the German authorities, if they deem it beneficial, may impose discretionary penalties upon such nazis. In addition, nazi party members, even though not in Class I or Class II, will not be allowed, for example, to hold policy-making positions in government or engage in political activities except as approved election codes permit them to vote.

ENFORCEMENT — GERMAN RESPONSIBILITY

Responsibility for executing this program will be placed primarily upon the Germans, who will therefore have to establish special denazification machinery. Each Land will have a Denazification Minister who will appoint one or more denazification tribunals for each Kreis, with a Special Prosecutor for each Tribunal. The Tribunal will consist of at least three anti-nazi Germans. At Land level the Minister of Denazification in consultation with the Minister of Justice will designate an Appellate Tribunal, comprising at least three anti-nazi judges.

Investigation of each registrant is to be made by the Special Prosecutor, and important cases will be heard by the Kreis Tribunal whose decision, in appro-

priate cases, can be appealed to an Appellate Tribunal. As an additional precaution, the Minister of Denazification is empowered to review any case or class of cases. If the Minister believes any classification to be too low, or penalty too lenient, he can re-open the case, order a re-hearing or take other appropriate action.

MG SUPERVISION

Under this plan, the role of MG is one of supervision. The Minister President and the Denazification Minister will be directly responsible to MG for effective and just denazification. MG control will be exercised primarily at Land level through directions to the Denazification Minister and through approval of regulations issued by the Minister under a German denazification law, to be enacted in each Land if the plan is approved.

While policy will be supervised at Land level, the operation will be checked at Kreis level by MG's Special Branches which are vital links in the new program. MG will have to be kept continuously informed of the workings of the Tribunals and Prosecutors. It will, therefore, have to maintain an effective organization reaching down to the Kreis level. The present Special Branch, operating under the direction of Public Safety, will be the supervising agency in each Kreis. Because of this, Special Branch and Denazification Field Inspection units will not be reduced if the plan becomes effective. Their staffs, on the contrary, may need strengthening.

TRANSITION PERIOD

In this connection, the Board envisaged a 90-day transitional period during which Special Branch would have to perform certain functions to accomplish the turnover of denazification to the Germans. The main function will be screening of the German personnel who are to administer denazification. This in-

volves vetting the Ministers of Denazification, Special Prosecutors, members of Kreis and Appellate Tribunals and the principal members of their staffs to assure that only qualified officials are entrusted with this responsibility. German officials will also need aid and advice in setting up offices, training their employees and establishing proper procedures. During this transitional period, Special Branch will have to continue screening Germans for important governmental and private positions.

This turnover phase will allow Special Branch to arrange for the orderly transfer of backlogged denazification matters to German Tribunals and to advise the tribunal of necessary priority in which such cases should be considered. From the experience gained in this transitional operation, Special Branch offices will be able to determine their own supervisory procedures for checking the work of the Germans and the types of reports to be required from the German authorities.

After this 90-day period, the functions of Special Branch will include the screening of new officials and employees of German denazification agencies; maintenance of central Nazi party records and informational service to assist the German denazification officials, and provision of such further aid as is necessary.

Most important of all Special Branch duties after the complete transfer of denazification responsibility to the Germans will be the constant checking of the operations of the Tribunals and Special Prosecutors. This is to be ac-

complished by a thorough analysis of individual case records, statistical reports, spot checks, investigations of denunciations and other complaints from the people at large.

Only through this incessant vigilance will MG be able to assure that denazification is being carried out in accordance with Control Council Directive Number 24. If necessary, MG can exercise its reserved power to order, through the Minister of Denazification, the re-opening or review of any particular case in which it feels justice has not been done.

USFET Insignia


The shoulder sleeve insignia worn by members of Headquarters, USFET, is also authorized for wear



by the military personnel of the Offices of Military Government for Bavaria, Greater Hesse, Württemberg-Baden

and the elements thereof.

Directors of the designated Offices of Military Government have been instructed by Headquarters USFET to insure that the members of their commands wear only the authorized patch on their left shoulders and not those of any previous commands to which they may have been assigned or attached.



The German communications network, one of the main vehicles for nazi propaganda and war preparations, is now being reconstituted to serve the people, within the limitations of the Potsdam agreement.

When a German in the pre-V-E Day Reich, mailed a letter, or sent a telegram, or used the phone, or listened to the radio, or rode on a bus, he was probably using one of the many services of the vast network of organizations called the German Reichspost. This huge autonomous organization had reached into the vitals of nearly every means of communication.

To compare this organization with any in the United States, the U.S. Post Office would have to incorporate into a single government agency the telephone companies, the telegraph companies, a majority of the radio network and communication services, and a large part of the bus services. It would also have to provide an extensive banking and financial system for the public. If all this were done the U.S. Post Office would approach the complexity of the Reichspost.

ORGANIZATION

Direction and control of the Reichspost was accomplished through the Ministry of Posts in Berlin, headed by a Cabinet Member who was usually a careerist in the postal service. The Ministry performed staff functions for regulating and coordinating communications throughout Greater Germany. The Reich was divided into 38 areas known as Reichspost Districts (Direktionen), each headed by a president who was fully responsible for the direction of all communications services within his area, in conformity with the regulations and instructions provided by the Ministry. Interference from the

Ministry was held to a minimum, thus providing a highly decentralized administration and allowing the presidents to adapt the services of the Reichspost to the best advantage for the particular community it served.

PERSONNEL

All Reichspost employees, with the exception of some laborers and miscellaneous housekeeping personnel, are regular government employees with an organization very similar to the U. S. Civil Service. The German Civil Service, however, occupies a much more important place than corresponding services in other countries. Its history goes back some hundred years and it survived the German Empire of Bismarck, the Weimar Republic and functioned with a high degree of success under the nazi regime. Officials are sub-divided into two categories; the "career service" entry to which is by competitive examination, and the "political service" which requires no examination. The latter category was frequently used by the nazis for inserting party members into various positions in the Reichspost with the additional requirement of a personal oath of allegiance to Hitler. Because of the high technical qualifications required of communications personnel, the greater percentage of the Reichspost employees, belonged to the "career service." Preference in both categories was given to ex-military personnel to a much greater degree than in the United States and other countries. During the Weimar Republic, it was cus-

Tomary to employ all soldiers who had served at least 12 years in the army communications system. The nazis followed a much more liberal policy of preference for all ex-members of the armed forces Kas a part of their plan to keep a reservoir of trained technicians available for instant call to active service. In addition, positions were often the reward for joining the party and active support of party policies. This practice is largely responsible for the present shortage of personnel, especially in the important administrative and supervisory positions which were infested with "political service" employees appointed under nazi rule.

V-E DAY

On V-E Day the Reichpost was completely paralyzed. By order of the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Forces, all civilian communications were suspended throughout the occupied areas. Years of intensive Allied air attacks had destroyed large quantities of equipment, buildings, transport and records without which such an intricate organization cannot operate. Employees had been scattered and disorganized: Many of them been prominent nazis who feared retribution and remained in hiding for many weeks. The Wehrmacht had drawn heavily on technical personnel and many had been killed or were prisoners of war. The only communication channel was a small group of Allied-operated radio stations which were used primarily for disseminating news and instructions to the people. Even this means was lim-

ited by the destruction of receiving sets during the campaign.

PROGRESS IN RESTORATION AND REHABILITATION

As the first step toward providing common communications policies throughout occupied Germany, the Allied Communications and Posts Committee was established in Berlin, under the Directorate of Communications and Posts, a division of the Allied Control Council. However, until a Central Department of Communications and Posts is established the communications in Germany will be administered separately by the four occupying powers.

Of the 38 Reichspost Districts that made up pre-war Germany, six are in the U.S. Zone. Postal Telegraph and Telephone officers were assigned to each district to reorganize and direct the restoration of communications services. A Communications Branch was established in Frankfurt, as part of the Internal Affairs and Communications Division, OMG (US Zone), for the direction and supervision of operations in the zone. Directorates of Reichspost officials were set up at each Reichspost District headquarters in organizations very similar to the pre-war administration, and communications on a limited scaled were resumed.

POSTAL SERVICES

Prior to the occupation, the Reichspost operated an extensive postal service system, which included all the features of the U.S. Post Office Department, plus many services not provided by our system. Among these are the Postal Check and



Fig. 1. Volume of mail originating in US Zone in past four months.

Fig. 2. Increase in telephone rehabilitation in US Zone.



Transfer system, the collection of commercial accounts and an extensive pneumatic tube delivery service in Berlin and Munich. The Postal Check and Transfer system is a banking service for the payment by cash from one account to another, intended primarily for the use of small businessmen and persons whose means do not warrant a bank account. It is widely used by commercial firms, however, and had expanded to some 1,600,000 accounts by 1942. The postal savings system was non-existent in Germany prior to 1938, but after "Anschluss," the Austrian Post Office Savings Bank was absorbed by the Reichspost and its services extended to all parts of the Reich. It operated as a non-profit service paying a low rate of interest to avoid competition with the banks, and offering maximum security to the depositors. The Reichspost also provided a money order service similar to that used in the United States. All financial services are now in use in the U.S. Zone, on an intrazonal basis, pending agreement by the four occupying powers to extend facilities to all zones.

OTHER SERVICES

In addition to letter service (ordinary, registered, express and special delivery, c.o.d., and money letters) the Reichspost acts as a distributing agency for newspapers, domestic and foreign, and periodicals. Subscriptions are accepted at post offices and deliveries made by post. The

post office does not engage in buying and selling, nor does it accept responsibility for deliveries. However, cheaper postage rates are offered and most publications are handled in this manner: Some 9,700,000 newspapers were delivered in the U. S. Zone during December 1945. Parcel post is not being used extensively at the present due to the limitations of transport and personnel, but the volume is increasing monthly with some 400,000 pieces handled during December 1945. Interzonal mail service to all occupied zones was inaugurated in October 1945. It provided for the distribution of postcards, letters (ordinary and registered, up to 500 grams) group articles up to 500 grams (packages subject to easy inspection containing articles of similar nature, usually samples), commercial papers and correspondence for the blind. The volume of mail (excluding newspapers, periodicals and parcel post) originating in the U.S. Zone during the past four months is shown in Fig. 1.

TELEPHONE SERVICE

German telephone service is also provided by the Reichspost and, in terms of station equipment and personnel, is one of the best in the world. It is estimated that 85 percent of all installations were automatized before the war. Limited long distance dialing was available up a distance of 40 kilometers, and plans and experiments had been made to provide di-

aling for long distance service throughout Germany. Government ownership and direction provided standardized equipment and qualified employees, subsidized technical research and encouraged a uniform distribution of networks. The relative usefulness of this service was reduced, however, by the German attitude that the telephone is a luxury for the poor and little effort was made toward distribution to the masses. This is perhaps the leading factor in Germany's low (eleventh place) standing in telephones-per-capita among the leading nations. Prior to the war there were only 4,000,000 telephones in service in Greater Germany (including Austria and the Sudetenland) as compared to approximately 22,000,000 in the United States. At present restoration of telephone is restricted by the difficulty encountered in replacing fixed plant equipment destroyed during the Battle of Germany. Progress is also hampered by a critical shortage of politically acceptable administrative and technical personnel. Progress in the rehabilitation of telephone service in the U.S. Zone is indicated in Fig. 2.

RADIO

Prior to V-E Day, the Reichspost was responsible for the technical supervision and maintenance of all radio broadcast facilities in the Reich. Programs were provided and controlled by a government corporation under the Propaganda Ministry. Since radio is one of the foremost means of direct contact with people, the nazis encouraged maximum development and provided unlimited funds for expansion. Continuous experimental work was carried on by the Institute of Research, a division of the Ministry of Posts, and by the highly cartelized telecommunications equipment industry. To prevent listening to foreign broadcasts, the nazi government encouraged the manufacture and distribution of a cheap (approximately RM 35), low-powered receiving set and the construction of numerous low-powered stations for simultane-

ous transmission on the same frequency, thus providing programs well within the reach of every German.

Point-to-point radio communications were almost entirely limited to international circuits, since wire facilities were considered adequate for a country of Germany's size. The Reichspost also operated the Marine radio services and acted as technical adviser and personnel examiner for the extensive aeronautical network maintained by the Air Ministry. Among their special services was the radio equipped Berlin-Hamburg express trains which enabled passengers to maintain contact with their homes and offices while traveling. Amateur radio was rigidly supervised and it was forbidden even to listen on the amateur frequencies without a special license. There were only 5,000 licensed amateurs in Germany 1939 as compared with over 50,000 licensees in the United States.

All civilian radio activities have been suspended since the occupation. The Information Control Division operates six radio broadcast stations to provide programs of news and entertainment for the German people and Displaced Persons, and a Hellschreiber (radio teletype) system is being used for news distribution to German language newspapers published in the U. S. Zone.

FUTURE DEVELOPEMENT

Future development of all telecommunications services is subject to an agreement reached at the Potsdam Conference, which specified that the standard of living in Germany would not exceed the average standard of living of the other European countries exclusive of the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union. Although definite numerical limitations have not as yet been placed on the development of telecommunications, tentative recommendations have been submitted to the German Standard of Living Board, and final decision and action is pending quadripartite discussion.

Sterner Justice

for Gun-Toting Germans



Germans who persist in carrying weapons in the U.S. Zone, in defiance of occupation regulations, are to face sterner justice in the future. In accordance with a recent USFET directive, the gravity of this offense must be taken into full consideration in meting-out sentences.

It is felt that the German people have been given sufficient warnings and offered ample opportunities and periods of amnesty to turn in firearms. The security of Military Government, the military forces and the civilian population has been constantly threatened by violations of this type, and the maintenance of law and order in the U.S. Zone depends upon the proper disposition such cases.

Weapons cases in which there is sufficient evidence to justify a trial will be transferred from a summary military court, after a preliminary hearing, to either a general or an intermediate military court for action and disposition as it is deemed that the jurisdictional limitations of a summary military court are insufficient to allow adequate punishment.

TO PUBLICIZE SENTENCES

In the past, there has been a wide diversity in the sentences imposed by the different courts for such infractions of the law, and henceforth it will be the policy to have the penalties as severe as the circumstances in each case warrant.

Where a death penalty or a long term prison sentence is imposed it is intended

to publicize widely the action of the court in order to bring home to the German population how serious an offense Military Government considers illegal possession of arms and ammunition.

Prosecutors in these cases will be instructed to make every effort to impress upon the court the following considerations:

a. During the eight months since the capitulation of Germany, two periods of amnesty for the surrender of weapons have been granted, and in addition a 10-day period has been allowed under the provisions of Control Council Order No. 2.

b. A case of possession arising today is, therefore, of a much more serious nature than in the past, since ample opportunity has been given for proper disposal of any weapons a person may have had.

c. To constitute adequate punishment, in view of the above, and to act as a deterrent to future offenders, sentences imposed upon conviction must be very severe.

d. Pleas and evidence introduced in mitigation must be examined thoroughly with the above facts in mind, for the possibility of extenuating circumstances at the present time which would justify a reduced penalty is remote.

Uniform Information Policy

A quadripartite information directorate, designed to implement the major tasks agreed upon at the Potsdam Conference and to disseminate world-wide news

Continued on page 16

THE LEADERS of th

Not only men and equipment but also wise leadership were the decisive factors in beating the German Wehrmacht. But winning the "fighting war" was only half the task of the United Nations. To win the peace and prevent Germany from ever again threatening world security will demand statesmanship and wisdom of the highest caliber.

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UNFINISHED TASK

To the men named here falls the difficult task of achieving the Quadripartite aims for Germany. The Control Council, Coordinating Committee and Staff is reproduced so that all MG personnel may familiarize themselves with the men who are now working to finish the job.

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Alternate — M. de la Tournelle
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Alternate — Lieut. J. P. Crona, USNR



Continued from page 13

throughout Germany, is being considered by the occupational powers.

Such services would be maintained for a considerable period of time extending beyond 1 July 1946.

Pending the establishment of such agreement, informal quadripartite discussions with representatives of the information control services of the four occupying powers will be continued as a means of securing agreement for informational programs to be carried out by the occupying powers acting jointly, or action which will be taken by the information control services of each of the zones acting independently from the others.

In the U.S. Zone, Information Control Services is working to accomplish a threefold task: (a), to remove remaining influences of nazism and militarism; (b), to further a desirable political development along democratic lines; and (c), to help guide the reorientation of German thinking.

It is hoped to turn responsibility for information services over to the Germans as rapidly as possible, consistent with maintenance of the present degree of thoroughness with which German participants in information services are vetted and the efficacy of present devices for preventing the dissemination of nazi or militaristic ideology.

Rural Police Force

Orders to establish a rural police force at the Land level of government in the U.S. Zone of Germany were contained in recent USFET directive.

The organization will be created within the Ministry of the Interior. Towns of up to 5,000 population will be allowed to contract with the Land rural police for police service in lieu of creating an independent municipal police department.

Facilities and suitable personnel of the abolished National Gendamerie (including the Motorized Gendamerie and the Moun-

tain Gendamerie) and all existing rural police agencies may be used in establishing the Land rural police.

Rural police personnel will confine their operations to the rural areas of the Land except in emergencies or when requested by the chief civil authority of a Stadtkreis or Gemeinde to render police assistance or when directed to do so by the Minister of the Interior.

Hiring of Ex-PWs

Repatriated German prisoners of war considered for employment by Military Government or by the German civil government must be re-screened by the Special Branch before hiring, in accordance with the appropriate denazification directives, USFET has ordered. Experience indicates that such re-screening is necessary to eliminate undesirable candidates.


Emergency Furloughs

The return of military personnel to the United States for emergency reasons will be expedited under the provisions of War Department Circular 14 issued 15 January 1946.

Authority to approve applications of emergency returnees is now vested with the theater headquarters. This authority normally will be used when authentic information has been received that the return of the individual will contribute to the welfare of a dying member of the immediate family, or where, through the death or serious illness or accident to such a close relative, important responsibilities are placed on the soldier which cannot be met from overseas or by any other person.

All approved applications forwarded through channels to USFET Headquarters will include individual's name, rank, ASN, organization, home address, statement clearly outlining emergency, and supporting evidence such as cablegrams or letters from persons having knowledge of the circumstances.

Election Results Show DEMOCRATIC PROCESS BEGINS



The results of the elections of January the 27th in Greater Hesse confirm the results obtained the previous week in 17 landkreise. Here again the Socialists have a wide margin of victory over all the other parties, receiving some 45 per cent of all votes cast. The Communist Party did somewhat better, due to its large support in the industrial kreise of Hanau and Gross Gerau. The Christian Democrats again took the lead in the prevailingly Catholic landkreise, Limburg, Bergstrasse, and the Taunus. In strongly Protestant areas the Liberal Democrats had some measure of success, indicating that they are far from accepting the assurances of non-denominationalism coming from the leaders of the Christian Democrats.

Military Government in Wiesbaden has pointed out that analysis of the figures obtained from these first elections reveals that the SPD did not receive the victory which the mere statistics would seem to indicate. Practically 70,000, nearly one-half, of the votes it obtained in the elections of the 20th came from Gemeinde in which it presented the only list or was opposed only by the Communists. Since the Christian Democrats polled more votes per candidate than the Socialists in Gemeinden where the two were in competition, it is felt that a further extension of the CDU organization into all the communities where the Socialists are functioning would materially cut down the latter's lead.

It is considerations of this nature which make it exceedingly difficult to

draw any specific conclusions from the recent elections. Now, however, that the leading political parties have been authorized at a Land level throughout the Zone, it may be assumed that they will all have an equal opportunity to campaign for the coming elections and to present lists in all communities. Some of the features which were objected to in this election will thus be eliminated.

WÜRTTEMBERG

Although, as of the time of writing, for the final results are not known Württemberg, partial returns indicate a very great difference between it and the other districts in the Zone. In Württemberg voters were given a "write-in" option which they might use in case they did not choose to vote a party ticket. It appears that the great majority actually did choose to by-pass the recognized parties. In 12 out of 19 Kreise some 230,000 votes were cast for a total of 4,786 councilmen. Of these votes 3,575 were for independent councilmen. The parties trail far behind with the Christian Democrats electing 691 councilmen, the Socialists 371, the Democrats (Demokratische Volkspartei) 65, and the Communists 54.

In such a situation it is manifestly impossible to draw any conclusions as to the real division of political strength. The question remains to be solved how those so far undecided will vote at a general Land election when, it is to be presumed, they will have to vote party tickets. The moderates, that is, the Christian De-

mocrats, maintain that they will eventually receive the backing of this very considerable portion of the electorate.

As yet no explanation of the curious results in Württemberg has been offered by either the Military Government officials or by the German licensed press. On the face of it one is tempted to jump to the conclusion that the German voters have in Württemberg clearly signified their distrust of organized political parties. This may be a more or less conscious hangover of Goebbels' anti-democratic propaganda, or it may simply testify to the inadequacy of the present political organizations. In either case these results do not confirm the generally encouraging trend of political activity in other areas. On the contrary, they cast some doubt on the validity of the returns obtained elsewhere. It might even be concluded that Germans who voted for the recognized parties did so in the other areas only because they had no choice. However, this would signify a general attitude of indifference and scepticism toward the elections themselves which the high percentage of returns does not bear out.

BADEN

In Baden, as was to be expected from this predominantly Catholic region, the Christian Democratic Union polled an absolute majority of all votes cast. As shown in the table, they received almost double the number of their nearest competitor, the Social Democratic Party.

There were certain peculiarities in the voting procedure in Baden which should be noted. According to the returns only 64 per cent of those eligible to vote actually participated. This would seem far out of line with the zonal average of 83.6 per cent. However, in many communities only one list of candidates was presented. When this occurred the list presented was considered automatically to be elected and no voting actually took place. In the towns which presented only one list, 949 seats out of a total of 1070 went to the Christian Democrats, and most of the remainder to the Socialists. In contested Gemeinden the Christian Democrats again won 1,827 seats as compared with the Socialists 445. (This four to one lead is in marked contrast with the two to one lead in popular suffrage.)

Tabulation of 27 January Voting (Excluding Württemberg)

Land or Regierungsbezirk	Total votes cast	Socialist	Com- munist	Christian Democrat	Liberal Democrat	Independ- ent & various	Percent partici- pating
Greater Hessen . . .	764 578	343 324	49 523	240 850	18 565	81 786	86
Baden	231 675	70 138	14 112	130 493	12 286	6 071	64
Niederbayern							
Oberpfalz	474 944	68 831	9 725	296 819	—	116 715	82
Oberbayern	466 990	77 227	11 078	225 491	1 716	111 905	89
Schwaben	304 742	29 428	4 160	88 624	160	178 005	86
Ober- und							
Mittelfranken . . .	406 199	107 794	15 922	91 919	18 654	159 547	86
Mainfranken	274 879	41 438	5 448	130 694	2	94 344	82
Total	2 924 025	723 180	109 968	1 204 388	51 381	748 373	83.6

BAVARIA

In Bavaria the Christian Social Union, inheritors of the tradition of the Bayerische Volkspartei as well as of numerous other conservative groups, was the sensational winner, polling something less than half of all votes cast. Only in Ober- and Mittelfranken did the Socialists fare better than the Christians. If it is true, as Josef Müller, leader of the Christian Social Union, states, that by next elections the independents will have come over to the CDU, this party could then count on the support of 75 per cent of the rural population. Leaders of leftist parties have conceded that these votes probably would go to the CSU in a general election.

"THE NAZI VOTE"

Bavaria is, of course, the only Land in the United States Zone which has at present the same boundaries which it had at the last free elections in 1932. It is, therefore, possible to make a comparison between the two elections. The Frankfurter Rundschau has done this in an editorial published the 29th of January. Here are the percentages it gives for the elections held on the 24th of April, 1932.

Bayerische Volkspartei	32.6%
NSDAP	32.5%
Social Democrats	15.4%
Communists	6.6%
Landvolk	6.5%
German National	3.3%
German People's Party	1.7%

And the figures for the recent elections:

Christian Social Union	43.2%
Independents and various	32.1%
Social Democrats	16.5%
Communists	2.3%
Liberal Democrats	1.0%

The comparison is indeed striking. It would appear, as the Frankfurter Rundschau suggests, that while the parties of the left have retained their former supporters, the Christian Socialists have taken over those of the BVP and the

other rightists parties, and the supporters of the NSDAP have voted almost to a man for the so-called independents and various splinter groups. Attractive as this hypothesis might be to some, it is not supported by an examination of the facts. In the first place, no account is taken of those who were not eligible to vote in this election by reason of their affiliation with the NSDAP. Second, a comparison is made between figures based on Bavaria as a whole in 1932 and others based only on the most conservative sections of Bavaria in 1946. Practically speaking, it will be impossible, without direct interrogation of individual voters, to determine the political orientation of former nazis.

"CHRISTIAN" A MASK

The Socialist and Communist party leaders in commenting on the recent elections have severely criticized the use of the label "Christian" by a conservative party. They maintain that this is simply a mask used to conceal narrow and reactionary group interests. In many cases, it is stated, the voter had no knowledge whatever of the programs of the various parties and simply chose the lists headed by the word "Christian" because of its reassuring connotation. Had there been more time for the parties to develop their organization and their program the results, it is contended, would have been quite different. The "Christians" readily agree, but state that the results would have been still greater in their favor, as it would have given them the opportunity of "Christianizing" the independents.

It is generally known that the Christian parties in the Zone all stressed the fact that they were non-denominational, while the pre-Hitler "Christian" parties were Catholic. So far, it would seem that neither the CSU or CDU has succeeded in winning over any large number of Protestant followers. These, as a group,

are more largely represented by the independents than by any authorized political organization. The Socialists are also making a strong bid to win their support, while the Liberal Democrats, the "also-rans" of this election, would seem to be the natural inheritors of at least the conservative wing of the Protestant

group. Without doubt, before the Land elections take place, this large group, which has not as yet committed itself for any party, will undergo a marked political evolution. The direction this evolution takes will largely determine the outcome of subsequent elections.



BETTER PAID ARMY

a suggested solution to occupation problems

Demobilization and occupation news continues to feature both press and radio comment as well as receiving prominent space in the news pages of the world.

Airing his views on the size of the postwar army on a Mutual Broadcasting Company program, Senator Edwin C. Johnson, puts the matter primarily on a dollar and cents basis. His comment was: "We've had no trouble hiring all the policemen we have wanted simply because we make the service and the pay attractive. In war-



time we recruit an Army largely on the noble impulse of patriotism, and in peacetime on the basis of three fairly good meals a day and a place to sleep. If we would make peacetime military service really worth while and pay what we pay policemen, for instance, we would have more volunteers than we could possibly use."

VOLUNTEER ARMY

Taking generally the same position as Senator Johnson, Cedric Foster on his MBS program expressed the opinion that "a voluntary Army of Occupation probably, in the last analysis, is what eventually will come about and that army will never come into existence unless leadership in the U.S. Army takes a realistic attitude about the responsibilities on its shoulders. The President, as Commander in Chief, should insist that a volunteer

army be made attractive enough for men to enlist in it; and they must know they are going to serve in foreign lands."

STRONG FORCE NEEDED

Commenting on the need for maintaining occupation forces, John Kennedy, on the American Broadcasting Company network, asserted: "The cold fact faces us that enough force must be maintained by all the Allies to control Germany and Japan, or else they will be up to their old tricks again. Today, for instance, there are Swiss businessmen predicting that Germany will stage an industrial and economic comeback quicker than any war-riven country, quicker even than her conquerors."

ETO vs PACIFIC

David Wills of the American Broadcasting System, championing the case of the Pacific soldiers stated: "There's a difference between the G.I. in the Pacific and the G.I. in Europe who wants to come home. Those in the Pacific mostly have been all the way through the conflict. Most of the combat troops in the European Theater who fought the Germans have been replaced by fresh troops who did not know the German in combat, who didn't want to go there. They were sent there. They were drafted for the war — when the war was over. They were sent over there for occupation; they're bored."

100,000 SOLDIERS NEEDED

H.V. Kaltenborn, on his NBC program said: "If we don't keep at least 100,000 well armed and well trained soldiers in Germany, that country will be taken over by Communists from within and without. That will probably mean another war in Europe before too many years."

REDEPLOYMENT-ISOLATIONISM

According to Cecil Brown of the Mutual Broadcasting System, "Britain and Russia recognize that they have a job to do in Germany and intend to do it. The end result of this cry of 'bring the Boys back home' is isolationism.

"The reasons why soldiers want to come home are many, and some of them are good reasons; but we have to remember that if the panic of home-coming is unchecked, then it will be understandable if America's influence abroad goes sinking. The need for men to keep up our strength overseas is obvious. These men have to come from somewhere, and they are not coming from voluntary enlistments, and the present draft is a war-time measure."

German Heavy Industry

Sharp issue was taken by John B. Kennedy on an ABC network program with the notion that Europe needs German heavy industry for its economic well-being.

"Those who are trying to keep it alive today are those who did business with the German cartels in the past," he charged. "They did it for the profit to themselves and the ruin or near ruin of their country. Germany's road to peace leads to the farm. Men and women in the German labor force can best serve themselves and the world by cultivating the German soil."

Occupation and Redevelopment

An ironical situation is seen by The Washington Star and The Minneapolis Times, in which while trying to re-educate the Germans, we have failed to sell the American GI on the necessity and desirability of occupation.



"One of the prime reasons for the series of 'we want to go home' demonstrations by troops abroad has been the failure of the soldiers to understand the Army's occupational and demobilization policies," avers The Star.

The Times theorizes that "there has been a serious failure somewhere to keep the American G. I. well informed as to the reason for his continued presence overseas. It is a little ironical that while we are trying hard to re-educate the enemy we are badly botching the job of explaining to our own soldiers the simple facts of occupation and demobilization."

MILITARY TRAINING BILL

The fact that the Army has not been receiving enough draftees from Selective Service since last August to refill fast-dwindling ranks, which, in turn, jeopardizes the Army's ability to carry out present foreign policy commitments abroad is termed a sign of Congressional laxity by a New York Times editorial. As a remedy, The Times suggests adoption of the universal military training bill and unification proposal made by President Truman. "Passage of these measures," the editorial asserts, "would do much to remove the present uncertainty which bedevils our military commanders and weakens our representatives in dealing with other powers."

Britain Turns to UNO

That Britain's foreign policy has taken an all-important new tack is evidenced by an article in The London Evening Standard wherein it is hinted that the



Cabinet has decided that "the cornerstone of future British foreign policy and security shall be the United Nations" and

further, that "Britain will oppose the settlement of international disputes and problems by meetings of the Big Three or Big Five."

In explaining the reason for this decision, the article goes on to say that the Ministers take the view what the future peace of the world is now solely dependent on the United Nation's Organization being made effective."

Unification Bill

Members of the Senate Military Affairs Committee reveal that an armed forces unification bill incorporating suggestions of both the Army and Navy is now being drafted and will be submitted to Congress for action within a month, according to The Washington Post. The bill, Senator Thomas, chairman, declared, will follow the general lines of the plan recommended by President Truman in his pre-holiday message.

Denazification Skepticism

The New York Times carried a story by its Berlin correspondent announcing plans of the Office of Military Government for Germany (US) to transfer the "responsibility for denazification from American to German hands and the fixing of a general long-term policy for the Nazis in Germany."

It is pointed out that a skeptical attitude is taken towards the plan by some, because of the "political tendencies of

the German people towards Fascism," the admission of "German political leaders that a free election held in Germany today would bring a modified nazi government into power" and finally the statements of MG officers who bring up the matter of the "1,000,000 nazis in the U.S. Zone not yet screened by the Military Government."

More On Occupation

In his discussion of the demobilization problem at a news conference in Toronto, The New York Times notes that General Eisenhower, like Mr. Royall, attributes much of the unrest to a wave of "bring-them-home" public opinion which is blinding American occupation troops to the importance of the Allies' unfinished task in Germany and Japan. The paper quotes the Chief of Staff as declaring: "This clamor to bring the boys home gets back to the soldier and has a very definite influence on his attitude and morale. He thinks, 'well, if everyone says bring us home, we must not have much to do over here.' It is extremely difficult for a commanding officer, in the face of this kind of thing to convince the men of the real importance of their assignment. If the democratic Allies believe that a good solid occupation of hostile territory is necessary, it is up to them keep our forces at a reasonable strength."

Drew Middleton, writing in The New York Times from Berlin, has a story that a high ranking officer there views soldier demonstrations as doing "more than anything else to lower the prestige of the U.S. in the eyes of the German population and weaken the authority of Military Government." Others, he asserts, "regard the demonstrations as a direct encouragement to the German resistance movements, which in recent weeks have begun to remind the Germans through pamphlets that national socialism is not dead, even though it is underground."

Station List

Military Government Elements

UNIT	LOCATION	OFFICE OF MILITARY GOVERNMENT	DIRECTOR OR COMMANDING OFFICER
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UNITED STATES FORCES EUROPEAN THEATER

Office of Mil Govt for Germany (U.S.) Berlin			Lt Gen Lucius D Clay
Office of Mil Govt (U.S. Zone) Frankfurt			Maj Gen C L Adcock

LAND WURTTENBERG-BADEN

Office of Mil Govt for Württemberg- Baden	Stuttgart		Col W W Dawson
1st Mil Govt Bn (Sep) (APO 738)			
Hq 1st Mil Govt Bn (Sep) Stuttgart			Col W W Dawson
Hq & Sv Co 1st Mil Govt Bn (Sep) Stuttgart			Lt Wm E Snodgrass
Mobile Maint Plat., Hq & Sv Co			
1st Mil Govt Bn (Sep) Zuffenhausen			1st Lt E Thompson
Hq 1st Mil Govt Mod Cp Stuttgart			

Württemberg

E-1	Stuttgart	Württemberg	Col W W Dawson
F-10	Stuttgart	SK Stuttgart	Maj R H Stimson
F-11	Ulm	SK-LK Ulm	Maj J Owen
G-20	Aalen	LK Aalen	Maj M Hoover
G-21	Böblingen	LK Böblingen	Capt W A Becker
G-22	Crailsheim	LK Crailsheim	Maj T Taylor
G-23	Esslingen	LK Esslingen	Lt Col J I Taylor
G-24	Gmünd	LK Gmünd	Capt J N Krajnak
G-25	Göppingen	LK Göppingen	Maj J A Holbrook
G-26	Schwäbisch Hall	LK Hall	Capt H A Wyatt
G-27	Heidenheim	LK Heidenheim	Maj B V Bloom
G-28	Heilbronn	LK Heilbronn	Lt Col H M Montgomery
G-29	Ludwigsburg	LK Ludwigsburg	Capt H K Manson
G-30	Waiblingen	LK Waiblingen	Capt H W Freeman
H-50	Backnang	LK Backnang	Capt V J Manno
H-52	Künzelsau	LK Künzelsau	Capt W L Strauss
H-53	Leonberg	LK Leonberg	Capt R S Deetz
H-54	Bad Mergentheim	LK Mergentheim	Capt R Forrest
H-55	Nürtingen	LK Nürtingen	Maj S A Warren
H-56	Ohringen	LK Ohringen	1st Lt M Korson
H-58	Vaihingen	LK Vaihingen	Capt J G Cox

Landesbezirk North Baden

Co E	Durlach	Landesbezirk	Capt R T Lynch
E-7	Karlsruhe	North Baden	Col C Lisle
F-16	Mannheim	SK-LK Mannheim	Maj L L Lewis
G-43	Heidelberg	SK-LK Heidelberg	Lt Col I L Harlow
G-46	Pforzheim	SK-LK Pforzheim	1st Lt N Semaschko
G-47	Karlsruhe	SK-LK Karlsruhe	Maj W T Neel
H-87	Bruchsal	LK Bruchsal	Maj E V Le Blanc
H-89	Buchen	LK Buchen	Maj J A McGuinness
H-90	Mosbach	LK Mosbach	Maj N A Moore
H-91	Tauberbischofsheim	LK Tauberbischofsheim	1st Lt J Zecca
H-92	Sinsheim	LK Sinsheim	Capt H D Peterson

LAND GREATER HESSE

Office of Mil Govt
for Land Greater Hesse
Wiesbaden

Col J R Newman

2d Mil Govt Bn (Sep)
(APO 758)

Hq 2d Mil Gvt Bn (Sep) Wiesbaden
Hq Co 2d Mil Gvt Bn (Sep) Wiesbaden
Sv Co 2d Mil Gvt Bn (Sep) Oberursel

Col J R Newman
Capt F A Decker
Capt B Sturdevan

Regierungsbezirk Wiesbaden

E-5 Wiesbaden
E-6 Frankfurt
F-15 Wiesbaden
G-41 Wetzlar
H-77 Dillenburg

H-78 Gelnhausen

H-79 Hanau
H-80 Weilburg

H-81 Hofheim
H-83 Rüdelsheim

H-86 Bad Homburg

RB Wiesbaden
SK Frankfurt
SK Wiesbaden
LK Wetzlar
LK Dillkreis &
LK Biedenkopf
LK Gelnhausen &
LK Schlüchtern
SK-LK Hanau
LK Limburg &
LK Oberlahn
LK Maintaunus
LK Rheingau &
LK Untertaunus
LK Usingen &
LK Obertaunus

Col J R Newman
Lt Col F E Sheeman
Lt Col F A Sansome
Maj M Baymen

Maj D B Bernstein

Maj M E Chotas
Maj T Turner Jr

Capt E F Duffy
Capt J C Nelson

Maj J G Gavin
Capt O Kuntzleman

Regierungsbezirk Kassel

Co C Kirchhain
E-4 Kassel
F-14 Kassel

G-38 Fritzlar

G-39 Marburg
G-40 Fulda
G-48 Korbach
H-65 Eschwege

H-67 Hersfeld

H-68 Hofgeismar
ML-1 (Sp) Kassel

RB Kassel
RB Kassel
SK-LK Kassel &
LK Melsungen
LK Fritzlar-Homberg &
LK Ziegenhain
SK-LK Marburg
SK-LK Fulda & LK Hünfeld
LK Waldeck & LK Frankenberg
LK Eschwege &
LK Witzenhausen
LK Hersfeld &
LK Rotenburg
LK Hofgeismar &
LK Wolfhagen
Linison

1st Lt J F Owen
Lt Col A Skarry

Lt Col R Bard

Capt G De Nubla
Maj L S Williams
Maj C F Russe
Maj E J Dikeman

Capt W B Getmann

Maj T T Turnbull

Capt S C Moore Jr
1st Lt M Rogin

Regierungsbezirk Hessen

E-3 Darmstadt
F-12 Darmstadt

F-13 Offenbach
G-31 Bensheim
G-32 Büdingen
G-33 Dieburg
G-34 Friedberg
G-35 Giessen
H-62 Lauterbach
DP-20 Darmstadt

RB Hessen
SK-LK Darmstadt &
LK Gross Gerau
SK-LK Offenbach
LK Bergstrasse & LK Erbach
LK Büdingen
LK Dieburg
LK Friedberg
SK-LK Giessen
LK Lauterbach & LK Alsfeld

Lt Col R W Copeland
Lt Col L G Kelly

Capt E J Emerick
Maj A C Leggatt
1st Lt T A Norris
Capt J M Nutt Jr
Maj R J Willard
Maj D M Easterday
Capt H Nickelsberg
1st Lt A J Peyser

LAND BAVARIA

Office of
Mil Govt for
Bavaria Munich

Brig Gen W J Muller

3d Mil Govt Regt
(APO 403)

Hq 3d Mil Govt München
Hq Co München
Sv Co München
B & T Co München
3d MG Med Det Munich
3d MG Med Sec München

Col C C Morgan
Capt J W Preston
Maj A S Keller
2nd Lt W T Lyons
Lt Col E R Jenney
Maj M J Kanner

Regierungsbezirk Mainfranken

Co A	Ochsenfurt	RB Mainfranken
E-202	Würzburg	SK-LK Würzburg
F-210	Würzburg	SK-LK Aschaffenburg
G-220	Aschaffenburg	SK-LK Schweinfurt
G-221	Schweinfurt	LK Kitzingen
H-250	Bad Kissingen	LK Kitzingen
H-251	Kitzingen	LK Alzenau
I-330	Alzenau	LK Brückenau
I-331	Brückenau	LK Ebern
I-332	Ebern	LK Gemünden
I-333	Gemünden	LK Gerolzhofen
I-334	Gerolzhofen	LK Hammelsburg
I-335	Hammelsburg	LK Hassfurt
I-336	Hassfurt	LK Hofheim
I-337	Hofheim	LK Karlstadt
I-338	Karlstadt	LK Königshofen
I-339	Königshofen	LK Lohr
I-340	Lohr	LK Marktheidenfeld
I-341	Marktheidenfeld	LK Mellrichstadt
I-342	Mellrichstadt	LK Miltenberg
I-343	Miltenberg	LK Neustadt a. d. Saale
I-344	Neustadt Saale	LK Obernurg
I-345	Obernurg	LK Ochsenfurt
I-346	Ochsenfurt	

1st Lt R E Handwerk
Lt Col M E Hendersou
Lt Col J B Bradford
Maj C M Emerick
Lt Col J B Thomson
Capt M A Potter
Capt L A Mercadante
Capt K L Ellis
Maj H P Clark Jr
Capt R W Jones
Capt J J Widmann
Capt J M Simon
Maj E G Emery
Capt J R Ellis Jr
Capt E F Smith
Capt W E Brayden
Capt L F Girolani
Capt Elmer E Kelly
Maj M B Voorhees
Lt L K Owens
Capt D J Huffman
Capt E F Warnke
Maj B H Logan
Capt J R Crain

Regierungsbezirk Ober & Mittelfranken

Co C	Ansbach	BB Ober and Mittelfranken
E-203	Ansbach	SK-LK Nürnberg
F-211	Nürnberg	SK-LK Ansbach
G-228	Ansbach	SK-LK Fürth
G-229	Fürth	LK Dinkelsbühl
H-261	Dinkelsbühl	LK Eichstadt
H-262	Eichstadt	LK Feuchtangenen
H-263	Feuchtangenen	LK Gunzenhausen
H-264	Gunzenhausen	LK Hersbruck
H-265	Hersbruck	LK Hilpoltstein
H-266	Hilpoltstein	LK Weissenburg
H-267	Weissenburg	LK Rothenburg
H-268	Rothenburg	LK Schwabach
H-269	Schwabach	LK Scheinfeld
H-270	Scheinfeld	LK Uffenheim
H-271	Uffenheim	LK Lauf
H-272	Lauf	LK Neustadt a. d. Aisch
H-273	Neustadt a. d. Aisch	
Co B	Bamberg	SK-LK Bamberg
G-222	Bamberg	SK-LK Bayreuth
G-223	Bayreuth	

Capt G N Hultzen
Col E N Haight
Lt Col C Klise
Lt Col W R Whitaker Jr
Maj J D Cofer
Lt Col J W Hall
Maj W T Stoots
1st Lt L D Smith
Maj H W Zurn
Maj H R Glaser
Maj H T Lund
Capt J J Carr
Maj R C Anderson
Maj R E Stringer
Maj H C Kauffmann
Maj E I Paul
Maj E N Humphrey
Maj F K Hinchey
2nd Lt B Lyons
Maj H L Woodall
Lt Col C J Reilly

UNIT	LOCATION	OFFICE OF MILITARY GOVERNMENT	DIRECTOR OR COMMANDING OFFICER
G-224	Erlangen	LK Erlangen	Lt Col F Robie
G-225	Coburg	SK-LK Coburg	Maj S Klein
G-226	Kronach	LK Kronach	Capt J F Begley
G-227	Hof	SK-LK Hof	Maj B P White
G-247	Lichtenfels	LK Lichtenfels	Lt Col J R Case
H-252	Ebermannstadt	LK Ebermannstadt	Capt J J Bianchi
H-253	Hochstadt	LK Hochstadt a. d. Aisch	Maj R G Hanford
H-254	Kulmbach	LK Kulmbach	Lt Col P B Lamson
H-255	Pegnitz	LK Pegnitz	Maj M F Skinner
H-256	Munichberg	LK Munichberg	Maj A C Ahlrott
H-258	Rehau	LK Rehau	Maj R H Dodds
H-259	Wunsiedel	LK Wunsiedel	Maj D H Alexander
H-260	Forchheim	LK Forchheim	Maj R J Nelson
I-347	Naila	LK Naila	1st Lt W P Morris
I-348	Stadtsteinach	LK Stadtsteinach	1st Lt H F Casademont

Regierungsbezirk Niederbayern & Oberpfalz

Co D	Regensburg		1st Lt H L Gross
E-204	Regensburg	RB Niederbayern & Oberpfalz	Lt Col Hasting
F-212	Regensburg	SK-LK Regensburg	Maj C G Doyle
G-230	Weiden	SK Weiden & LK Neustadt a. d. Wald	Maj J C Robertson Jr
G-244	Amberg	SK-LK Amberg	Maj J H Mattox
H-247	Cham	LK Cham	Capt L S Gagliardi
H-275	Burglengenfeld	LK Burglengenfeld	Capt E Fichter
H-276	Parsberg	LK Parsberg	Capt R E Boyd
H-277	Tirschenreuth	LK Tirschenreuth	Maj F P Murray
H-278	Neunburg	LK Neunburg vorm Wald	Capt S P Himie
H-279	Eschenbach	LK Eschenbach i. d. Opf.	Capt W R Baylies
I-349	Kemnath	LK Kemnath	1st Lt T E McGee
I-350	Nabburg	LK Nabburg	Capt F N Shanbacher
I-351	Oberviechtach	LK Oberviechtach	Capt R A Berry
I-352	Riedenberg	LK Riedenberg	Capt C V Hansen
I-353	Vohenstrauß	LK Vohenstrauß	Capt S Lesneski
I-354	Roding	LK Roding	Capt C R Bucheit
I-355	Waldmünchen	LK Waldmünchen	Capt R D Canover
I-356	Beilngries	LK Beilngries	1st Lt L C Johnstone
I-357	Neumarkt	LK Neumarkt i. d. Opf.	Capt W N Blanton
I-358	Sulzbach-Rosenburg	LK Sulzbach-Rosenburg	Capt A J Dann
Co H	Regensburg		1st Lt W S Mather
G-243	Passau	SK-LK Passau	Maj W Wickersham
G-245	Landshut	SK-LK Landshut	Maj H J Mraček
G-246	Straubing	SK-LK Straubing	Maj H T Olsen
H-301	Deggendorf	LK Deggendorf	1st Lt O A Childs
H-302	Eggenfelden	LK Eggenfelden	Maj E W Manning
H-303	Grafenau	LK Grafenau	Capt S Perlman
H-304	Kelheim	LK Kelheim	Capt C T Hutson
H-305	Landau	LK Landau a. d. Isar	Capt G C McCall
H-306	Pfarrkirchen	LK Pfarrkirchen	Capt W D Baird
H-307	Zweisel	LK Regen	Capt A R Sphar
H-308	Vilshofen	LK Vilshofen	Capt W J Fitzpatrick
H-309	Vilsbiburg	LK Vilsbiburg	Capt F Harris
H-310	Freyung	LK Wolfstein	Capt R W Douglass
I-375	Bogen	LK Bogen	Capt A G Albert
I-377	Dingolfing	LK Dingolfing	Capt E M Martocci
I-378	Griesbach	LK Griesbach	Capt A S Gallant
I-379	Kötzting	LK Kötzting	Capt J W Fleishman
I-380	Mainburg	LK Mainburg	Capt J W Leidy
I-381	Mallersdorf	LK Mallersdorf	Capt C N Ahlstrom
I-382	Rottenburg	LK Rottenburg	1st Lt E A Russo
I-383	Viechtach	LK Viechtach	Capt A L Corcelius
I-385	Wegscheid	LK Wegscheid	Capt H Walter

Regierungsbezirk Oberbayern

Co F	Munich		1st Lt W M Ellis
E-205	Munich	RB Oberbayern	Lt Col R F Brooks
F-213	Munich	SK-LK Munich	Lt Col E Keller Jr
G-236	Partenkirchen	LK Garmisch-Partenkirchen	Lt Col C H Heyl

UNIT	LOCATION	OFFICE OF MILITARY GOVERNMENT	DIRECTOR OR COMMANDING OFFICER
G-237	Ingolstadt	SK-LK Ingolstadt	Maj L H Norins
G-238	Munich	LK Munich	Maj M T Mawrence
H-286	Fürstenfeldbruck	LK Fürstenfeldbruck	Capt J J McBride
H-287	Landsberg	LK Landsberg	Capt M L Matt
II-288	Pfaffenhofen	LK Pfaffenhofen	Capt J E Thayer
H-289	Starnberg	LK Starnberg	Maj M W Nitz
H-290	Weilheim	LK Weilheim	Capt R J O'Dowd
H-291	Wolftratshausen	LK Wolftratshausen	Maj P L Steers
I-362	Aichach	LK Aichach	Capt L R Day
I-364	Schrobenhausen	LK Schrobenhausen	1st Lt R C Wiggins
I-367	Dachau	LK Dachau	Capt V A Burke
I-368	Schöngau	LK Schöngau	Maj C A Rein
Co E	Wasserburg		Capt D E Brown
G-231	Freising	LK Freising	Maj E Boney
G-232	Miesbach	LK Miesbach	Lt Col J Kelly
G-233	Traunstein	LK Traunstein	Maj C J Bischoff
G-234	Altötting	LK Altötting	Maj R L Montague
G-235	Rosenheim	SK-LK Rosenheim	Capt R H Nece
H-280	Erding	LK Erding	Maj C C Brown
H-281	Laufen	LK Laufen	1st Lt D L Price
H-282	Mühldorf	LK Mühldorf	Capt W M Forsy
H-283	Wasserburg	LK Wasserburg	1st Lt A L Klinger
II-284	Bad Tölz	LK Tölz	Capt V Thom
H-285	Aibling	LK Aibling	Maj E J Newmeyer
H-311	Berchtesgaden	LK Berchtesgaden	Capt W Caruso
I-361	Ebersberg	LK Ebersberg	1st Lt C C Smith Jr

Regierungsbezirk Schwaben

Co G	Ziemetshausen		Capt O Meirbenry
E-206	Augsburg	RB Schwaben	Lt Col C M Avery
F-214	Augsburg	SK-LK Augsburg	Lt Col R A Norton
G-239	Dillingen	LK Dillingen	Maj Darragh
G-240	Weissenborn	LK Neu Ulm	Capt J M Latimer
G-241	Sonthofen	LK Sonthofen	Maj J E Rhea
G-242	Kempten	SK-LK Kempten	Capt B M Ziegler
H-292	Donauwörth	LK Donauwörth	Capt L A Proper
H-293	Günzburg	LK Günzburg	Capt M Glossop
H-294	Markt Oberdorf	LK Markt Oberdorf	Capt B M Green
H-295	Memmingen	LK Memmingen	Maj R F Wagner
H-296	Mindelheim	LK Mindelheim	Maj E C Bunker
H-297	Neuberg	LK Neuberg a. d. Donau	Capt H E Reeves
H-298	Nördlingen	LK Nördlingen	Capt S H Brown
H-299	Füssen	LK Füssen	Capt S D Lubin
H-300	Krumbach	LK Krumbach	Capt C E Witney
I-369	Illertissen	LK Illertissen	Capt F E Kettunen
I-370	Kaufbeuren	LK Kaufbeuren	1st Lt R E Lee
I-372	Wertingen	LK Wertingen	2nd Lt W A Graham
I-373	Friedberg	LK Friedberg	Capt L Sims
I-374	Schwabmünchen	LK Schwabmünchen	Capt L E Smith Jr

U. S. SECTOR, BERLIN DISTRICT

Office of Mil Govt (U. S. Sector Berlin)	Berlin	U. S. Sector, Berlin District (APO 755)	Col F L Howley
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BREMEN PORT COMAND (APO 751)

Office of Mil Govt (Bremen Port Command)	Bremen	Bremen Port Command	Lt Col C H Scott
Office of Mil Govt for Bremen	Bremen	SK Bremen	Lt Col J M Sbamel
Office of Mil Govt for Wesermünde	Wesermünde	SK Wesermünde	Lt Col L S Diggs